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Flying Blind on Over-indebtedness?

In a video-taped interview seven months ago, I expressed a degree of optimism that, historically at least, we had not been over-indebting unacceptable numbers of poor microborrowers, based on an admittedly tenuous inference from high repayment levels in most of the world. Since then, various conversations and data points have left me less comfortable with that inference.

My guess was that most large, sophisticated MFIs had gotten pretty good at the reporting collection performance accurately. This may have been naïve: for instance, Sanjay Sinha says that recent portfolio testing by M-CRIL in a range of leading Indian MFIs revealed unsustainably high loan losses, notwithstanding published financial reports saying all was well. (Assuming this is true, is the problem data systems that still can’t do the job, or is it a deliberate pre-IPO window dressing by management?)

But let’s assume that reports of high repayment in most markets are true. If, as many practitioners think, the preponderant motivation to repay uncollateralized loans is the borrowers’ desire to keep future access to a valued service, then high repayment would seem to suggest that few of those borrowers think that they’re getting too deeply in debt. But conversations with David Roodman, Esther Duflo, and Abhijit Banerjee have forced me to recognize that we don’t really know how much of the loan repayment is driven by other factors, including pressure from groups or loan officers. If these latter motivations are widespread, borrowers may be repaying even if they haven’t experienced their loans as helpful.

Most importantly, microcredit markets are becoming saturated in more and more places. (This can happen at penetration levels that seem low: we microfinance enthusiasts tend to overestimate the percentage of the eligible population that will want a loan at any given time.) Gabriel Davel, South Africa’s former consumer credit regulator, observes that when competitive retail credit markets approach saturation, problems with over-indebtedness are almost inevitable: One probably shouldn’t expect microcredit to be an exception, given that few microcredit markets have good credit bureaus that allow a lender to check a loan applicant’s repayment of loans from other providers.

The point is not to assert that we have a generalized problem with over-indebted microborrowers. The point is that for most markets we simply don’t know. We’re flying blind in the face of a clear and present danger. Fortunately, more researchers are starting to look at levels of debt stress. But we’re still a long way from having solid, practical tools—especially early-warning tools—to identify problems. High default levels sometimes (not always) can tell us, after the fact, that a lot of clients have gotten over-indebted. But low default levels don’t mean that everything has been OK, even if the reporting is competent and honest. Borrowers might be repaying only at the cost of unacceptable sacrifices.

The obvious question here is what “unacceptable” means. That turns out to be an annoyingly complex topic that I don’t have time to write about, and you probably don’t have the time to read about, just now. I’m sure the question will rear its head in connection with later blogs in this series.

Comments

06 September 2012 Submitted by Shamsuddin Ahmad (not verified)

Microcredit differs from consumer credit in two important ways: first, it is not collateralized; and second, it is usually not approved on the basis of credit reports. So, how do microlenders establish whether the borrower will be able to pay back the loan? In the original model, this was usually done by the field officer that prepared and recommended the loan application. Usually, s/he will visit the borrower at her/his home, see the assets that s/he owns, and talk to the borrower and her/his family members about their income and corroborate some of the information with the borrower’s neighbors and peer group members. Only when the field officer is convinced about the creditworthiness of the borrower will s/he recommend that loan. This model has helped microlenders maintain a 98 percent repayment rate as only a natural disaster or circumstances beyond the control of the borrower induced a default.
Now comes the new model which is driven by large amount of funds available to microlenders provided by private sector investors seeking returns not available in any other investment. To keep costs low, the same field officer is now preparing three or four times the number of loan applications compared to before. So, s/he can only do that sitting in her/his office and talking to the potential borrower. S/he no longer has the time to visit the potential borrower’s home or check with her/his neighbors or verify the income and assets that the borrower is claiming to have. In some extreme cases, s/he even knows that the borrower has another loan from a competing microlender. However, under pressure to meet high disbursement targets, s/he overlooks all these facts and recommends the loan. Is it any wonder then that the borrower gets over-indebted. When the installment becomes due and the borrower does not have the funds to repay, s/he just goes to another fast expanding microlender to get a new loan to pay the outstanding dues. When the borrower cannot get any more new loans, s/he defaults and faces the wrath of the field officer.

Lesson learnt: Microcredit is best served by grant funds and subsidized credit from philanthropers, aid foundations, multilaterals and the like. It is not suited for private investment seeking high returns.

06 September 2012 Submitted by Bonnie Brusky (not verified)

With regard to one of your points–early-warning tools: researchers from the Center for Microfinance at the University of Zurich recently published a study on constructing an early warning index of over-indebtedness, the full report is available here: http://bit.ly/g7YEzS

06 September 2012 Submitted by Jacco Minnaar (not verified)

I agree that we are mostly flying blind in terms of the degree of over-indebtedness in different markets.

Here is a link to a recently published research that aims to develop an early warning tool to assess the risks of overindebtedness.

http://www.triodos.com/productpages/about_triodos/news/160651/overindeb…

Interesting reading and a good basis to have more discussion.
- Are the outcomes in line with practioners assessment?
- What can the countries most at risk do to mitigate the risks?
- How can the tool be furher improved?
- More countries should be covered.

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