Mobile Banking: Agents as Mediators

Following on from last week’s post on the concept of ‘mediated use’ – asking someone to complete all or part of a task that the user is unable, or unwilling to do – how motivated are agents in helping customers complete all or some of the task?

From an agents perspective there are a number of drivers for mediation: they can make money by supporting the customer to successfully complete a revenue generating task; increase loyalty; reduce error rates (and avoid dealing with arguments that come from erroneous use of the service e.g. double-checking a phone number prior to dialing puts the onus on the customer that the number is correct (Chipchase, 2006a); and/or reciprocity. If the agent is engaged in another businesses e.g. runs a grocery store or phone kiosk, then simply offering a service that brings in more customers for longer periods of time enables cross-selling and the time spent on mediating the task can be considered an effective loss-leader.

In situations where the transaction is likely to generate repeat business, where there is minimal competition for the agent i.e. the customer does not have practical alternatives to turn to, and where mediation takes ‘too much’ time and effort the agent will be motivated to teach the customer how to complete the task themselves. How realistic a scenario this is depends on the task complexity, the ability of the user interface to shorten the steps required to repeat positively completed tasks, and the skills of the mediator and the mediated. The risk of empowerment is that it becomes more viable for the customer to take their business elsewhere.

In contexts where there is demand for services and a sufficient gulf between the skills required to complete a task and the skills at hand services are services are more likely to spring up to meet a need: from writing letters; filling forms; navigating processes; to signing up pre-paid customers. This is particularly prevalent is contexts with high numbers of illiterate consumers.

One should not assume that the service agent will always act in the best interest of the consumer – if a moderate sum of money can arguably be sent in 1 or 2 tranches, each of which costs the same set commission how many tranches the agent prefer? Logic dictates however that over time consumers compare notes on the agents they use, and as with everything else in the marketplace understand the need to shop around to find the best deal.’

How to best leverage the malleability of the agents in an otherwise fairly rigid system design?

(Chipchase, 2006 ; Ratan, 2008; Morawczynski, 2009)

-Jan Chipchase